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NOTES
CYBERFINANCE: REGULATING BANKING
ON THE INTERNET
INTRODUCTION
The day is coming when people will not even leave their
houses to work, shop, or bank. One journalist imagines that a "day
in the financial life of a future consumer may begin something like
this: [w]ake up, log in, download some E-cash into your PC's hard
drive, then go cruise the virtual mall."' However, before this be-
comes a mainstream reality, many issues must be addressed.
This Note will address one aspect of this emerging financial
reality: non-bank entities taking deposits in exchange for electronic
cash on the Internet. Currently, the non-banks are entirely unregu-
lated and may operate in any fashion that they see fit. This Note
will focus on whether these institutions can and should be regulat-
ed, and if so, how to regulate them.
Non-bank institutions have the potential to be high risk opera-
tions, similar to pre-Depression financial institutions. For this rea-
son, and based upon the bargaining power and informational defi-
ciencies that abound throughout the market, the government is
justified in regulating these non-banks to protect the public from
1. Dave Skidmore, Cashless Internet Difficult to Police, THE ORANGE CO. REG., July
26, 1995, at C3.
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losses that would be suffered if the Internet non-bank system
failed. The government must choose its regulation wisely, so that
this new market segment, primarily driven by entrepreneurs, will
not be overburdened. There are many similarites between the cus-
tomer relations techniques used by Internet non-banks and tradition-
al financial institutions. The main concern with traditional institu-
tions is consumer safety and confidence. Since these are also the
main goals of regulating Internet non-banks, regulators may logical-
ly draw from existing banking regulations. Regulations such as
deposit insurance, reserve requirements, capital requirements, and
investment restrictions serve to increase consumer safety and confi-
dence. These standard-setting techniques, where regulators define
the means as well as the ends, are the methods that should be used
to regulate these non-banks.
Part I of this Note describes the Internet, the daily business
activity that occurs over the Internet, and its potential for future
commerce activity. Further, current regulations for traditional finan-
cial institutions are outlined in detail. Part II is an in-depth analysis
of the regulation possibilities for Internet non-banks. It explores the
jurisdictional issues, focusing on interstate commerce, and delves
into the justification for regulation of a market in general. Next,
the circumstances surrounding Internet non-banks are examined.
Specific types of regulations applicable to non-banks which facili-
tate optimal performance in the public and private sectors will be
outlined. Part II also examines the potential benefits of regulation
for non-banks.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Internet
The medium contributing to the current technological revolu-
tion is an entity called the Internet. One way to envision the
Internet is to "imagine an enormous spider web comprising thou-
sands of smaller webs, permitting a continuous line to be traced
from any point on any of the smaller webs to any point on any
other web."2  In the beginning, the Internet (then called
"Arpanet"3) was an experimental communications network devised
as part of a system to guarantee uninterrupted communications in
2. Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behav-
ior in Cyberspace through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 2 (1994).
3. Arpanet, an acronym for Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, was estab-
lished for the Department of Defense. See Andrew Grosso, The National Information
Infrastructure, 41 FED. BAR NEwS & J. 481, 481 (1994) (describing what is meant by
the information superhighway and who controls it).
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the event of a nuclear war.4 To accomplish this, "it was designed
with no central command that might be vulnerable to an outside
attack."5 The recent commercialization of this system has drastical-
ly increased its size and scope. There were four sites when it be-
gan in 1969, and thirty-seven in 1972.6 The most recent survey
conducted in January 1994, indicates that 2,217,000 host computers
now exist.7 Each host computer has the capability to support thou-
sands of users at a given time.'
The Internet operates through a loose connection of individual
computer systems, commonly called "nodes."9 Each node processes
the information that it receives, which often includes a "pass it on"
command. If a node does not have a direct connection to the
destination computer, it will send the information to a different
node that does have a direct connection with instructions to "send
it on," although no route is specified." This process continues
until the information reaches its intended destination. 2 This meth-
od of transmitting information accounts for the Internet's decentral-
ized existence and the vastness of its resources. 3 In spite of its
apparent complexity, it is relatively simple to tap into this enor-
mous technological resource. All one needs is a personal computer
with a modem, 4 "a phone line, an account with a provider, and
software for connecting and navigating. '5
Currently, the most common use for the Internet is electronic
mail ("e-mail"). Approximately forty million people worldwide use
this form of communication. 6 In addition to e-mail, the World
4. See Dunne, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Grosso, supra note 3, at 481.
6. See Dunne, supra note 2, at 2-3.
7. See id. A different survey reported the number of computer hosts at 4.8 million,
with 10,000 added every day. See Penny Lunt, Payments on the 'Net: How Many? How
Safe?, AMERICAN BANKER'S ASsN. BANKING J. 46, 50 (1995) (discussing the problems of
banking through the Internet and the future role for existing banks).
8. See Dunne, supra note 2, at 2-3.
9. See Grosso, supra note 3, at 481.
10. See id. at 482.
i1. See id.
12. See id.
13. "Because of the flexibility in the way the Net routes its information transfers, and
because each node operates independently of the others, no particular computer system or
group of systems is essential to the functioning of the Net." Id.
14. A modem is a device that a computer uses to send and receive digital information
over analog telephone lines. See Paul Taylor, Perspectives: Internet's Surf City--Here We
Come, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1994, at 1.
15. A vast majority of Internet users connect to it using Internet access providers who
are directly connected. The cost of connecting directly to the internet is too expensive for
the average consumer. See Gregg Keizer, The Internet Made Easy, CoMPUTERLIFE, Mar.
1995, at 74, 76-77.
16. See James Mayer, On-Line Law and Order, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 14, 1995,
at El. It has been reported that approximately one billion e-mail messages are sent over
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Wide Web ("WWW") is rapidly providing the Internet with world-
wide acceptance. One author describes the WWW as the "brightest
piece of the Internet."' 7 The WWW's format uses a graphical
browser, which allows the user to view pages.' These pages are
screens packed with text and graphics, with links to other pages. 9
Not only is the format pleasing to the eye, it is easy to use. Once
logged on to the WWW, the only piece of operational equipment
needed is a computer mouse. There are no complex commands to
learn.
The number of people joining the Internet revolution is grow-
ing. One commercial provider, America Online, reports that almost
5,000 new people subscribe to their service daily."0 Consumers as
well as commercial businesses are becoming aware of the possibili-
ties available on the Internet. Not surprisingly, early entrants to this
market have been those looking for a profit.
B. Commerce on the Internet
The number of merchants selling goods, services, and informa-
tion over the Internet is staggering. Some researchers estimate that
more than 25,000 merchants in 150 countries are selling or adver-
tising products and services to twenty million users.2' One bank
executive predicted that "the Internet will evolve into the most
efficient means of delivering products and services."' Just as im-
portantly, the number of people buying goods through their home
computers is significant and steadily increasing. A recent survey
found that thirty-two percent of Internet users have purchased prod-
ucts and services using the Internet and that ninety-one percent
planned to make purchases in the future.' One research company
estimates that Internet commerce totaled approximately $350 mil-
lion dollars in 1995.24 Further, many "economists predict that 20
the Internet every month. See Lunt, supra note 7, at 46.
17. Keizer, supra note 15, at 76.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Mayer, supra note 16, at El.
21. See Skidmore, supra note 1, at C3.
22. Joseph Radigan, Info Highway Robbers Try Cracking the Vault . . .or 50 Million
Ways to Fleece your Banker, U.S. BANKER 66, 66 (1995).
23. See Internet and Smart Cards Top ABA Conference List, CARD NEWS, Sept. 18,
1995, available in WESTLAW, CARDN database, 1995 WL 8159249 (reporting results
from a study conducted by Global Concepts, Inc., derived from three sources: telephone
interviews with forty retailers, ranging from Fortune 500 corporations to small businesses;
focus groups of consumers using on-line services; and an online survey of those who
access the WWW).
24. See Cryptic Cyberspace Credit, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Feb. 5, 1996, at 6D.
Some retailers are really taking advantage of this new sales opportunity. For example, the
1-800-FLOWERS company, a flower retailer, estimates that at least $2.5 million of their
total annual revenue is generated from Internet sales. See id.
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percent of all household expenditures will go through the Internet
in less than 10 years."'  And that over the next five years, "bil-
lions of dollars will be poured into the Internet. . .with the ex-
pected return on investment in triple digits.
26
The current system of buying goods, services, and information
over the Internet is like using an interactive catalog. The customer
dials into a merchant's "store" and browses until a desired item is
foundV The customer then places the order and transmits credit
card information over the computer to the merchant.' However,
not all merchants are equipped to accept credit card transactions.
Some merchants may prefer to accept anonymous electronic curren-
cy instead of paying for the credit card services, especially if the
merchant will be accepting small transactions.29
Because credit card companies charge merchants a percentage
fee for each transaction, between ninety-four to ninety-eight percent
of each credit card sale is recouped after the fees are assessed. 0
For very small transactions, the total profit to the merchant after
such fees are assessed is minimal. Smaller sales are a significant
part of the business transacted in this country; of the more than
300 billion cash transactions in 1994, 270 billion were for less
than two dollars.'
A possible solution to the fee problem is the development of
electronic cash ("e-cash"). Most e-cash plans now in use involve
cash-like certificates issued to consumers by banks or other curren-
cy providers.32 Both the merchant and buyer have accounts with
the provider and pay a fee for e-cash privileges.33 The provider
25. Ray Wyman, Virtual Cash: Internet Figures to be E-Cash Medium; Future Smart
Money May Bypass Banks, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at 28.
26. Id.
27. The customer uses her computer's modem to call her access provider, and then
uses a graphical browser to find the merchant's page. See supra notes 14-20 and accom-
panying text (describing in full the process of connecting to the Internet and the WWW).
28. However, any information sent over the Internet is subject to prying eyes. For
example, a "message can pass through . . .multiple systems on its way to its final desti-
nation and maybe someone, somewhere along the way, is scanning these messages for
credit card details; details which could be used for criminal purposes, making this system
insecure." Money on the Internet (visited Aug. 20, 1996) <http://www.digicash.com/ecash/
moneyonnet.html>. In a recent Harris poll "82% of Americans . . . expressed concern
over privacy of computerized data." David Chaum's Testimony for U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (visited Aug. 20, 1996) <http://www.digicash.condpublish/testimony.html>.
29. See Noel D. Humphreys, Cybercash, 17 PA. LAW. 38, 38 (1995) (explaining elec-
tronic currency and how it functions).
30. See EDWIN L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYsTEM 752 (2d ed.
1994).
31. See Internet and Smart Cards Top ABA Conference List, supra note 23.
32. See Humphreys, supra note 29.
33. See Frank Bajak, Currency In Form of Electronic Cash Hits the Internet, ORANGE
Co. REG., Oct. 23, 1995, at A3.
1996]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"has a 'mint' that creates 'coins,' which are specially encoded
symbol strings based on deposit amounts."34 When the buyer
wishes to make a purchase, he downloads the "coins" to his com-
puter hard drive and transmits them to the merchant.35 Then the
merchant sends the "coins" back to the provider, who verifies their
authenticity.36 Assuming that the user-fee is less than the discount
rate for credit transactions, consumers could use these "coins" in
small transactions, solving the merchant's credit card fee problem.
All of the existing e-cash systems are variations of the process
described above. NetBank's system relies on e-mail to transfer its
NetCash coupons.37 To buy NetCash, the customer sends a check
to the NetBank." The customer then receives e-mail from
NetBank that looks something like this: NetCash US$ 25.00
A123456B789012C.39 The customer is then free to spend the
twenty-five dollars as he pleases. When making a purchase using
NetCash, the customer must have exact change." The customer
may request change for his twenty-five dollars simply by sending
e-mail to NetBank, which then returns coupons denominated as the
customer requests.4 Once the customer has the exact change
needed, he will send e-mail to the merchant (or through the
merchant's Web page) with the NetCash coupon (NetCash US$
5.00 C345678D901234E).42 Using e-mail, the merchant then sends
a notice of acceptance to the NetBank.43 Anyone with an e-mail
address can accept NetCash." However, only those with NetBank
accounts can turn their NetCash back into real money.45 The pro-
cess involves sending e-mail to NetBank requesting that they de-
posit NetCash into the customer's account. Once a month
thereafter, a reimbursement check will be issued.' The advantages
of this system are that no special software is needed,
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Frequently Asked Questions (visited Aug. 20, 1996) <http://www.netbank.com/-
netcash/ncfaq.html#i>.
38. See id. There is a 2% fee for purchasing NetCash. See id.
39. See Quick Start Guide: 1. Buying NetCash from the NetBank (visited Aug. 20,
1996) <http://www.netbank.com/-netcash/ncquickl.html>.
40. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 37.
41. See id.
42. See Quick Start Guide: 3. Sending NetCash to Merchants (visited Aug. 20, 1996)
<http://www.netbank.con-netcash/ncquick3.html>.
43. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 37. The merchant is simply checking
with NetBank to verify that the serial number on the certificate is valid. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. To receive a NetBank account, there is a one time fee of $19.95. See id.
46. See id. There is a "conversion fee" of two percent or four dollars, whichever is
greater, deducted from the reimbursement check. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 37.
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there is no transaction fee,' and the only privacy risk during a
transaction is that someone might view the amount of NetCash
being transferred.
A slightly different system is being used by DigiCash. This
company markets its own software package to facilitate the transfer
of e-cash among its participants." This software runs in the back-
ground of a computer system and is available whenever the user
decides she wants to send or receive e-cash." Originally,
DigiCash issued "Cyberbucks," which were fictitious coins with no
real money backing them in order to test the system." However,
Digicash has now licensed its system to Mark Twain Banks, which
is opening e-cash accounts in real dollars.5 The user opens an
account at the Bank (assuming real dollars are being used and not
the Cyberbucks) and then downloads as much of the deposit into
her computer as needed 2 This process is done simply by clicking
the withdraw button on the software and then entering in the
amount to withdraw. 3 The software then manages any payments
or collections that the user makes, including automatically making
change if needed. The Bank's only role in the e-cash transaction
is ensuring the authenticity of e-cash forwarded to it by the pay-
ee." The software also manages all transactions, creating an elec-
tronic "bank" statement. 6 As helpful as the software can be, there
is one major limitation to this system: only people who own it
47. The only fee is the conversion fee. There is no charge for spending or accepting
NetCash or making change. See id.
48. See Digicash-An Introduction to ecash (visited on Apr. 15, 1996)
<http://www.digicash.com/publist/ecash_intro.html>.
49. See id.
50. See DigiCash ecash-about ecash (visited Aug. 20, 1996)
<http://www.digicash.com/ecashfabouthtml>.
51. See DigiCash ecash-ecash issuers (visited on Aug. 20, 1996)
<http://www.digicash.comecash/ecash-issuers.html>. Therefore, the current DigiCash project
with Mark Twain Banks is not relevant to the subject of this Note because Mark Twain
Banks is already subject to regulation. However, Digicash admits that a "growing number
of banks, financial institutions and other organizations are very interested in issuing
ecash," implying that non-banks could purchase the technology. Digicash ecash--about
ecash, supra note 50.
52. See DigiCash-An Introduction to ecash (visited Aug. 20, 1996)
<http.//www.digicash.com/publishIecash_intro/ecash_intro.html>. These deposits could also
be down-loaded onto a plastic card that is embedded with a computer chip. See Kelley
Holland & Amy Cortese, The Future of Money, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 66, 66.
53. See DigiCash-An Introduction to ecash, supra note 48.
54. See id.
55. See id. To ensure that each coin is used only once, the Bank keeps track of the
serial number of each coin it issues. When the Bank receives coins from the payee, it
will check to verify that it has a record of that serial number, and that the serial number
has not already been returned. This process confirms the serial number's authenticity and
validity. See id.
56. See id. (showing what an electronic bank statement looks like).
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may receive e-cash.
Banks and financial institutions are venturing into this new
area of Internet finance, which is not unlike other traditional bank-
ing transactions. However, as noted previously, many private non-
banks are using the e-cash concept. One of these non-banks,
CyberCash, Inc. of Virginia, was founded in 1994 to develop
Internet payment systems." Their goal was to establish a "trusted
link between the seemingly unpredictable world of cyberspace and
the traditional banking world. CyberCash serves as a conduit
through which payments can be transported easily, safely, and
instantaneously between buyers, sellers, and their banks."58
DigiCash has been the most aggressive company in this are-
na." They rely heavily on cryptography' to make the e-cash se-
cure, and their system allows registration and verification by the
issuer without revealing the customer's identity." Therefore,
DigiCash's e-cash is "as anonymous as the dollar bill in your
wallet."' 2 In order to test its idea, DigiCash gave fifty merchants
and approximately 5,000 consumers one million dollars in e-
cash. 3 It has been said that "[i]f non-banks successfully introduce
their own brand of digital cash, they could bypass banks as prima-
57. See CyberCash First Electronic Payment Developer to Receive International Export
Approval, M2 PRESSWiRE, May 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, MAGSPLUS database,
1995 WL 10478529 (describing CyberCash, Inc.).
58. Id. CyberCash, Inc. mainly deals in secured credit card transactions, not e-cash as
described in this Note. See Who We Are (visited on Aug. 23, 1996)
<http://www.cybercash.com/cybercash/info/overview.html>.
59. See Wyman, supra note 25, at 34 (discussing e-cash corporations).
60. Cryptography is the most popular method of securing information transmitted over
the Interet:
[It involves] two cryptographic keys, a public key and a private key. The send-
er of [information] holds the private key and is the only person with access to
it, a crucial requirement to the validity of the public key encryption system.
The sender uses the private key to encrypt the [information]. The receiver
decrypts the [information] using the public key. This key, made available to the
public by the private key holder, will decode any message initially encrypted
by the holder's private key (and only by the holder's private key). Any attempt
to alter the encoded [information] results in decoding what amounts to "digital
garbage," thereby ensuring the authenticity of the [information].
Grosso, supra note 3, at 483.
61. See Wyman, supra note 25, at 28. This anonymity is achieved using "blind signa-
tures." The user's computer generates blank coins hidden in digital envelopes when it
makes a request to download e-cash. These digital envelopes will be sent to the bank and
marked with a validating stamp, which also marks the blank coins inside. Then these
validated envelopes are sent back to the user's computer, where the coins are taken out
of their envelopes. The result is a validated coin lacking the signature of a particular
user's computer. See DigiCash Ecash-An Introduction to ecash, supra note 48 (discussing
verification).
62. Wyman, supra note 25, at 28.
63. See id.
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ry providers of consumer financial services. These companies, not
the banks, will then become the consumer's first contact when they
want to obtain digital money."'
C. Existing Bank Regulation
Chartered banks and institutions associated with them are
subject to extensive federal regulation; non-banks are currently
unregulated. The question of whether non-banks should be subject
to comparable regulation is important. This is true especially in
light of the issues of consumer confidence and protection that arise
in both the traditional banking and non-bank forums.
1. Operation Laws
One important reason for regulating banking institutions is to
ensure that the financial sector remains stable.65 The existence of
deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration ("FDIC") increases confidence in the system.' It also puts
an end to banking panics, because potential insolvency of one bank
will not threaten other banks in the network.' "A major cause of
cumulative bank failures is depositors who attempt to be first in
converting their bank deposits into currency."6 The FDIC covers
$100,000 per account."'
Deposit insurance tends to create a sense of security in an
individual depositor regardless of the actual financial status of a
bank. As long as a bank is insured by the FDIC, depositors will
remain loyal." Depositor confidence may prompt banks to take
more risks.' However, depositor overconfidence may tempt a
64. Id.
65. See DAvID S. KIDWELL & RICHARD L. PETERSON, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MAR-
KETS, AND MONEY 253 (4th ed 1990); see also GEORGE J. BENSTON & GEORGE G.
KAUFMAN, RISK AND SOLVENCY REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS: PAST POLI-
CIES AND CURRENT OPTIONS 22 (1988) (noting that "[a] major reason for banking super-
vision in most countries is protection of depositors from the loss of their investments").
66. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 254.
67. See id. at 268. The legislative history from the enactment of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act documents the insurance fund's success. "Insurance of bank deposits by the
Corporation [FDIC] began on January 1, 1934. The results since that date bespeak the
outstanding record the Corporation has achieved in bringing to depositors sound, effective,
and uninterrupted operation of the banking system with resulting safety and liquidity of
bank deposits." H.R. REP. No. 81-2564 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3765,
3765-66.
68. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 268.
69. See id. at 255. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 ("FIRREA') restructured the FDIC, dividing it into the Bank Insurance Fund,
covering banks, and the Savings Account Insurance Fund, covering savings and loans. See
PETER S. ROSE, COMhMRCIAL BANK MANAGEMENT 82 (2d ed. 1993).
70. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 259. "Insurance of any kind makes
people somewhat less careful because the costs or penalties of loss are perceived to be
less than they would be without insurance." BENSTON & KAUMAN, supra note 65, at 23.
71. "[Flederal deposit insurance provides a safety net for banks . . . [and] [bloth theo-
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bank into financial ruin. The FDIC has developed a "police mental-
ity" in order to protect overconfident depositors from banks who
may take advantage of their loyalty. As an insurer, the FDIC has a
vested interest in preventing institutional failure. The FDIC has
instituted various policies to ensure the safe operation of depository
institutions.72 One author has noted that the FDIC's "power to
examine banks and issue cease and desist orders inhibits much risk
taking by bank management and shareholders."73
Any depository institution "engaged in the business of receiv-
ing deposits" can apply to the FDIC and receive coverage.74 How-
ever, there are at least six factors that the FDIC analyzes in grant-
ing coverage to an institution: the financial history and condition of
the depository institution; the adequacy of the depository
institution's capital structure; the future earnings prospects of the
depository institution; the general character and fitness of the man-
agement of the depository institution; the risk presented by such
depository institution to the insurance fund; and the convenience
and needs of the community to be served by such depository insti-
tution.'
In addition to deposit insurance, traditional banking institutions
are subject to many balance sheet restrictions that are intended to
prevent failures and promote stability in the industry.76 They are
subject to certain capital requirements, reserve requirements, and
limitations in the types of securities that they may hold.7
Banks must have a certain minimum capital at start-up and
must maintain satisfactory levels during their existence."8 Federal
ry and evidence on safety nets in other activities indicate that they tempt participants to
increase their exposure to risk." BENSTON & KAUFMAN, supra note 65, at 23; see also
Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 325, 350 (1990) ("So long as the government guaranteed their deposits, institutions
whose assets may have been worth far less than their liabilities could nevertheless contin-
ue to attract deposits by offering higher interest rates, and could engage in additional
risky investments-as well as continued speculation").
72. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 259. "[T]he presence of federal
deposit insurance, enormously increased the necessity for vigilant bank examination, en-
forcement of capital requirements sufficient to provide a cushion against losses, varying
deposit insurance premiums with the riskiness of the lending and investing activities of
the insured institutions, and a readiness to close down S&Ls that were effectively insol-
vent." Kahn, supra note 71, at 350.
73. ROSE, supra note 69, at 474.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1994). Some state laws require financial institutions to insure
their deposits with the FDIC. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1101.061 (Baldwin
1994), repealed by H.B. No. 538, 121st General Assembly (repealing the former section
but moving the FDIC requirement to another section); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.41
(Baldwin 1994) (requiring savings and loans to obtain FDIC coverage).
75. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816.
76. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 270.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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statute requires that a bank must initially have at least $100,000
capital at start-up.79 Further, they must have a "paid-in surplus"
equal to twenty percent of capital." Banks have been required to
maintain higher capital requirements since FIRREA was passed.8
Banks are now required to hold capital in an amount at least equal
to three percent of their assets in order to remain in good standing
with the regulators.82 Adequate capital is additional assurance
against institutional failure because losses are written off against
capital.83 Therefore, the more sound the bank's capital account the
more prepared it is for any losses that may occur. Additionally,
"[c]apital regulation by regulatory agencies has become an increas-
ingly important policy tool to limit how much risk exposure banks
can accept, thereby promoting public confidence and protecting the
government's deposit insurance system from massive losses.""
Banks are also required to maintain certain reserves to ensure
that the institution will have adequate liquid assets in case of nu-
merous or large withdrawals.85 These reserves are a percentage of
their deposits and certain nondeposit liabilities that are held at their
district Federal Reserve bank or as cash in their vault.86 The
amount of reserves varies with the volume and type of deposits
that the bank holds. 7 For transaction deposits,8 the reserve re-
quirement is three percent of the daily average amount held over a
two-week period, up to $42.2 million.89 For amounts over $42.2
million, the reserve requirement is ten percent.' Interestingly, the
reserve requirement is not what actually provides day to day li-
quidity;9' excess reserves that banks have voluntarily set aside
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 51. However, the statute does provide that if the institution is
formed in a place with a population of not more than 6,000, the capital requirement is
only $50,000. Further, if the population is over 50,000, the capital requirement is in-
creased to $200,000. See § 51.
80. See § 51. Surplus is normally referred to as the "excess amount above each share
of stock's par value paid in by the bank's shareholders." ROSE, supra note 69, at 475.
81. See KIDWELL & PErERSON, supra note 65, at 272.
82. See id. at 273. In practice, this amount is probably closer to five percent of their
assets. See ROSE, supra note 69, at 484.
83. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 270.
84. ROSE, supra note 69, at 471-72.
85. See KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 270.
86. See id. at 203.
87. See ROSE, supra note 69, at 362.
88. Transaction deposits are checking accounts, negotiable orders of withdrawal
("NOWs"), and other deposits that can be used to make payments. However, they are not
short-term business or consumer certificates of deposit, or savings accounts. See id. at
362-63.
89. See id. at 362. The $42.2 million figure was the cutoff amount as of April 1992.
The law requires this amount to be adjusted every year by the Federal Reserve Board.
See id. at 362 n.1.
90. See id. at 362.
91. See id. at 208. Since the reserve requirements would be tied up in the bank's
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provide liquidity.92 However, the reserve requirements do provide
emergency liquidity because a bank could use these amounts to
satisfy depositor withdrawals rather than failing, taxing the insur-
ance fund, and penalizing depositors.93 The only negative impact
is that the bank will be penalized for dipping below its reserve re-
quirements.94
In an effort to further reduce risk, banks are restricted in the
type of investments that they may make. Most regulators require
that banks only invest in "investment grade"'95 corporate or munic-
ipal bonds. Further, banks are not allowed to invest in equity secu-
rities (i.e. stock).' "The prohibition on owning equity securities
represents the belief that banks should not own risky assets because
losses on these securities could precipitate bank failures."'  Equity
securities are riskier than bonds because there is no guaranteed
principal. With bonds, the initial investment is returned if the bond
is held until maturity. However, stock value is entirely a function
of the market and investors are subject to a loss of the entire ini-
tial investment. A huge stock portfolio loss would absorb large
amounts of capital and may actually reduce a bank's deposit base.
Additionally, an unscrupulous bank could use its ownership powers
to take control of a company.98 Thus, the prohibition against own-
ership of equity securities by banks serves several ends.
2. Consumer Protection Laws
In addition to the regulations affecting the internal operation
of banks, there are many consumer protection laws that banks must
comply with. These regulations also increase consumer protection
and confidence. Much of the consumer protection law regarding
debit cards and wire transfers comes from the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act of 1978. 9 The Federal Reserve Board promulgated
Regulation E in order to meet the Act's requirements."° Regula-
tion E covers all electronic funds transfers ("EFT"), defined as
Federal Reserve account, the money could not be used to satisfy withdrawals. Moreover,
any amount used to satisfy customer withdrawals would place the bank in non-compliance
with reserve requirements. See id. at 206-09 (detailing a non-compliance scenario).
92. See ROSE, supra note 69, at 208.
93. See id. at 209.
94. See id.
95. Investment grade means only "bonds rated Baa or higher by Moody's or BBB or
higher by Standard and Poor's." KIDWELL & PETERSON, supra note 65, at 270.
96. See id.
97. Id
98. See id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b)-(r) (1994).
100. See Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.1-.15 (1995); see
also RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 839 (2d ed. 1994) (identifying the source of
the laws).
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"any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check,
draft, or similar paper instrument, that is initiated through an elec-
tronic terminal, telephone, or computer or magnetic tape for the
purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institu-
tion to debit or credit an account."'' The regulations define fi-
nancial institution as "a State or National Bank... or any other
person who, directly or indirectly, holds an account belonging to a
consumer.' '1°" A point-of-sale transaction using a debit card is a
good example of an EFT. The debit card communicates informa-
tion about the customer's account to a central computer, which in
turn contacts the customer's bank to verify the funds.0 3
Regulation E requires anyone engaging in an EFT to disclose
terms and supply transaction records, "thus increasing consumer
information."'' The purpose of disclosures like these are to keep
prices in line with costs. 5 If consumers have insufficient infor-
mation about some terms of the payment contract, they will not
place competitive pressure on those terms." "If ignorance shields
some terms of the contract from competition, the implicit price of
the item will get out of line with the cost of providing it."' 7
Regulation E also limits the loss consumers can suffer from
the fraudulent use of an ATM or other debit card.' "[Tihere is
no consumer liability unless the card or access device has been
accepted by the consumer (not merely mailed unsolicited) and the
means of access includes a way of identifying the person autho-
rized to use it, such as personal identification number (PIN).' 1°9
If these preconditions are met, the consumer's liability is limited to
"the lesser of $50 or the actual loss that occurs prior to the fiman-
cial institution receiving notice of possible unauthorized use.""'
Failure to report the loss or theft of the card or access device
within four business days after the consumer learns of it raises the
101. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (emphasis added).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(i). Account is defined as "a demand deposit (checking), savings,
or other consumer asset account." § 205.2(b).
103. See RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 838.
104. Id. at 839. One of the more important of these disclosures is the pricing of EFT
services, which is required under 15 U.S.C. § 1693(c). See id. at 844.
105. See id. at 842.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1995). For statutory authority, see 15 U.S.C. § 1693(g).
See also DAVID LASTER & JOHN WENNINGER, Policy Issues Raised by Electronic Money
(paper presented on April 21, 1995, at the Conference on Digital Cash and Electronic
Money organized by the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, at the Columbia Business
School) (visited on Mar. 15, 1996) <http://www.ctr.columbia.educitiemoney.html>.
109. RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 946.
110. Id. at 946-47.
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limit of liability to $500.'" Further, if the consumer fails to re-
port an unauthorized transfer within ninety days of the receipt of
their periodic statement, the consumer is liable for any and all loss-
es."1
2
Credit transactions have similar consumer protection laws. The
Consumer Credit Protection Act,"3 which includes the Truth in
Lending provisions and the accompanying Regulation Z," 4 are the
main consumer protection laws covering credit transactions. In
order to meet the guidelines of Regulation Z, four conditions must
be met: (1) the credit must be offered or extended to consumers;
(2) the offering or extension of credit must be done regularly; (3)
the credit must be subject to a finance charge or payable in more
than four installments; and (4) the credit must be primarily for
personal, family, or household purposesY.5 "Credit" is defined as
"the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment.""..6 The typical credit transaction involves many parties:
The two immediate parties to a credit card transaction are
the purchaser, who uses the card to pay, and the merchant,
who accepts the payment. Additional parties include the
bank that issued the card to the purchaser, the bank which
enrolled the merchant in the credit card system, and the
credit card corporation, which usually processes the transac-
tions."'
Regulation Z has provisions for disclosure and limited liability,
that are similar to those for EFTs."' However, with credit trans-
actions there is a greater concern with the cost of credit and its
calculation. To this end, each state has enacted usury laws setting
the maximum interest rate that can be charged on consumer
loans." 9 Further, the regulations state that the cost of credit must
be disclosed in terms of its Annual Percentage Rate ("APR")20 to
111. See id. at 947.
112. See id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994), as amended by Acts of May 18, 1995 and Sept. 30,
1995, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.33 (1995).
115. See § 226.1(c)(1).
116. § 226.2(a)(14).
117. RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 715.
118. Compare § 226.6-.7 (requiring that the consumer be provided with a detailed initial
disclosure statement, listing all finance (and other) charges, and acknowledge the existence
of a security interest) and § 226.12(b) (limiting liability to the lesser of $50 or the
amount charged before notification to the card issuer) with supra notes 104-12 and ac-
companying text.
119. See RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 717.
120. The Truth In Lending Act employs the APR as a "yardstick" for expressing inter-
est rates on consumer loans. See id. at 733.
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enable consumers to compare the true cost of credit at different
institutions. 2'
Further, deposit account transactions (i.e. checks) have similar
consumer protection laws. The Truth in Savings Act" lists many
of the disclosure requirements. The purpose of this Act is to re-
quire the "clear and uniform disclosure" of interest rates payable
on deposit accounts and fees assessable against deposit accounts
"so that consumers can make a meaningful comparison between the
competing claims of depository institutions with regard to deposit
accounts.""1as The Act is implemented through Regulation DD.
124
There are provisions requiring account disclosures when an account
is opened and thirty day notice to the customer of any changes
from the initial disclosure." There are also requirements if an
institution provides a periodic statement. 126
D. The Problem
Since the Internet non-banks are not being subjected to these
types of regulations, they are the financial institutions that create
concern within financial and political circles. 7  The "non-bank
financial institutions that can accept or transfer assets, in the form
of funds or commodities, that are not adjuncts of traditional, char-
tered banks""a are the subject of this Note. The question is
whether this concern is justified, and if so, what can and should be
done about it.
The [APR] ... shall be computed by multiplying each periodic rate by the
number of periods in a year and . . . shall be determined as follows . . . [if]
the finance charge imposed during the billing cycle is or includes a minimum,
fixed, or other charge not due to the application of a periodic rate, other than
a charge with respect to any specific transaction during the billing cycle, by
dividing the total finance charge for the billing cycle by the amount of the
balance(s) to which it is applicable and multiplying the quotient (expressed as a
percentage) by the number of billing cycles in a year.
12 C.F.R. § 226.14(c).
121. See RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 30, at 733.
122. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13 (1994).
123. § 4301(b).
124. Truth in Savings (Regulation DD), 12 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-.9 (1995) (providing for the
disclosure of rate information, methods of interest computation, fees, balance information,
and features associated with particular accounts); see also RUBIN & COOTER, supra note
30, at 205.
125. See § 230.4-.5.
126. See § 230.6 (requiring statement to reflect amount of interest, fees imposed, and
length of statement period).
127. "Phantom" Cyberbanks Pose Laundering, Tax Evasion Threat, MONEY LAUNDER-
ING ALERT, July 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1995 WL
8353498 (discussing the "speed, security, and anonymity" of cyberbank activities which
may entice money launderers and tax evaders).
128. Id.
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HI. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction Over Non-Banks
The first question to be addressed is whether these non-bank
entities operating only on the Internet could be subject to federal
regulation. This is essentially an issue of congressional authority,
and is largely outside the scope of this Note. However, this Note
will briefly explore possible ways that the federal government
could regulate these entities using the Commerce Clause.'29
Internet non-bank's use of the telephone lines is the most prob-
able link to congressional commerce clause authority. As one au-
thor put it, "[D]on't forget that telephone lines-all telephone
lines-are a utility that government can easily regulate, and does
so with near impunity.""13 The government already uses its com-
merce clause authority over telephone lines to obtain jurisdiction
over certain crimes. For example, it is a federal offense to defraud
another person using the telephone wires in interstate com-
merce.' It is also a federal offense to produce, traffic or use a
counterfeit access device 32 to defraud if it affects interstate com-
merce.'33 Because a system of Internet e-cash would necessarily
require that information is exchanged between computers in differ-
ent states via telephone lines, these exchanges would likely meet
the definition of "interstate commerce.' ' 34
Another example is the criminalization of fraud-related activity
in connection with financial institution computers via the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984.13 The Act defines financial insti-
129. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the sev-
eral States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
130. Wyman, supra note 25, at 28, 34.
131. It is illegal for any person to devise any scheme to defraud or to obtain money or
property and transmit by means of wire communication in interstate commerce any writ-
ings for the purpose of executing that scheme. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
132. An access device is "any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial num-
ber, mobile identification number, personal identification number ... or other means of
account access that can be used . .. to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing
of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds." 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1)
(1994).
133. "Whoever-(1) knowingly and with intent to defraud produces, uses, or traffics in
one or more counterfeit access devices . . . shall, if the offense affects interstate com-
merce . . . be punished ...... 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
134. Many Internet connections are maintained through regular analog telephone lines,
but some are maintained through "dedicated" communication lines that carry Internet trans-
missions. However, the manner of transmission is irrelevant because the nature of the
Internet requires that these transmissions travel through interstate commerce. See supra,
notes 2-14 and accompanying text (describing the organization of the Internet). But cf
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding regulation of gun posses-
sion in a school zone pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) to be an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
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tution as "an institution, with deposits insured by the [FDIC].' 136
More directly, federal law appears to require that any entity taking
deposits37 be subject to examination and regulation by the federal
and/or state government. 3  Additionally, two federal court cases
suggest that there is nothing about Internet actions that distinguish-
es them from any other activity covered by federal law.'39 Thus,
Congress could reach Internet non-banks through its commerce
clause authority, and courts will likely not distinguish these elec-
tronic actions from any others.
B. Justification for Regulation
Assuming that the federal government can obtain jurisdiction
over non-banks, it will still face challenges over how it uses this
power. The issue of whether or not to regulate will be addressed in
the abstract and then applied to the specific situation confronting
regulators on the Internet.
"The rationale for economic regulation presumes the existence
of circumstances such that regulation will improve the working of
the market system."'" Circumstances when the free market no
longer works efficiently are generally referred to as "market fail-
ures..''. There is a strong presumption that the free market is the
best system for achieving optimal results, and that government
regulation is not desirable because it interferes with this sys-
tem. 4 ' A corollary of this presumption is that public officials do
not possess enough knowledge about the industry (or the Internet)
136. § 1030(e)(4).
137. See infra, note 252 (defining deposits under 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)).
138. The Glass-Steagall Act states in pertinent part:
[It] shall be unlawful ... (2) For any person, firm, corporation .. .or other
similar organization to engage, to any extent whatever with others .. . in the
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presen-
tation of . . . evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor, unless such
person, firm, corporation .. . or other similar organization (A) shall be incor-
porated under, and authorized to engage in such business by, the laws of the
United States or of any State .. . and subjected, by the laws of the United
States, or of the State ...wherein located, to examination and regulation.
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (1994). The punishment for not complying with this section is a
fine of not more than $5,000 and/or prison for no longer than five years. If a firm vio-
lates the section, the officers, directors, employees, or agents of the firm may be subject
to the punishment. § 378(b).
139. See, e.g., Religious Technologies v. F.A.C.T.N.E.T., 907 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo.
1995) (posting unpublished information over the Internet as a copyright infringement);
United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (involving e-mail threats
which crossed international boundaries).
140. George Daly & David W. Brady, Federal Regulation of Economic Activity: Fail-
ures and Reforms, in ECONOMtC REGULATORY PoLICtIEs 171, 171 (James E. Anderson ed.,
1976).
141. See id.
142. See ALAN STONE, REGULATON AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 45 (1982).
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to regulate it successfully." When considering the regulation of
an industry, government should determine: (1) whether the unregu-
lated market performs at a high level, both economically and so-
cially; (2) whether there is sufficient justification for the regulation;
(3) whether regulation will cause the market to perform better than
without the regulation; and (4) whether the benefits of regulation
outweigh the costs. " There are many different formulations of
the justifications for regulation, 45 but they all rely on similar no-
tions. One formulation is that regulation is justified when there are:
natural monopolies; 0  public goods; 47  third-party effects;
absence of competition; 49 informational deficiencies; 5 ' or ineffi-
cient extraction of natural resources.'' Another more thorough
formulation is presented by Alan Stone; he provides three major
categories of market failure that may justify regulation: efficiency,
externalities, and equity.'52
The efficiency justification concludes that under certain circum-
stances the free market will not utilize its resources properly.
53
These circumstances arise with both natural and market monopo-
lies, the need to coordinate an industry, and the need to promote
an industry.'54 However, because the efficiency justification deals
143. See id.
144. See id. at 56-57.
145. See Daly & Brady, supra note 140, at 172-74 (discussing both economic and non-
economic efficiency rationales for government regulation).
146. Certain types of production are inherently inconsistent with a competitive market
structure. For example, telephone service or natural gas distribution would involve needless
duplication of facilities if more than one firm. were to provide the service. Freed of com-
petition in the market, these firms will not operate at an optimal level and require regula-
tion. See id. at 172.
147. These goods are commodities that if they are supplied to anyone, must be supplied
to everyone. Examples are national defense, police protection, and disease control. Since
everyone must benefit from these services, no rational consumer will voluntarily pay for
them. This requires the government to finance these activities through the imposition of
involuntary taxes. See id.
148. When the production or consumption of some commodity affects the welfare of
third parties, the government will intervene to subsidize those activities that exude positive
third party effects (i.e. education) and tax or restrict those that have harmful effects (i.e.
pollution). See id
149. When a monopoly has formed in a market, the government will intervene through
antitrust actions to restore competition. See id. at 173.
150. The efficiency of the free market relies on its participants being fully aware of the
costs and benefits of the commodities that are transferred. When this information is diffi-
cult for consumers to obtain (i.e. drug purity), the government intercedes to ensure infor-
mational flow. See Daly & Brady, supra note 140, at 173.
151. If the market is inefficient in its use of natural resources, the government will step
in to maximize the use of this resource. For example, before seamless pipes were used to
transport natural gas billions of cubic feet of natural gas were lost each day. See id.
152. See STONE, supra note 142, at 63.
153. See id. at 65.
154. See id. at 65-88 (describing, in detail, the circumstances that create market failures
under the efficiency justification).
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primarily with competitive behavior, it does not apply to the non-
banks discussed herein.5 ' The second justification concerns man-
aging the externalities of an industry. 56 An externality is "an ac-
tivity that imposes costs or benefits upon persons who are not
parties to a transaction or contract."'57 This market failure will
not justify regulation of non-banks because the primary concern is
with parties to non-bank transactions. The final and most applicable
market failure, referred to as the equity justification, focuses on the
freedom to contract as an essential element of a free market sys-
tem. 8 Freedom to contract promotes efficiency in that the agree-
ment allows each party to choose the most optimal terms for their
benefit. 9 The foundation of this argument is that private law re-
quires the formation of all contracts to be rational and just."6
Stone's conception of rationality, termed instrumental rationality, is
defined as the "consideration of alternative means to the end, of
the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally
of the relative importance of different possible ends."' 6'
If one of the assumptions underlying the free contract system is
missing, then the government must step in to protect the pub-
lic. "2 There are four instances where this occurs: government
agreements, discriminatory contracts, bargaining power disparity,
and information disparity.' Government agreements are not at
issue here because contractual difficulties only arise when the gov-
ernment grants an operational privilege to a company."6 Non-
banks do not operate under this system. In addition, discriminatory
contracts are not an issue for non-banks since there is presently no
155. Currently there are many companies, such as DigiCash, CyberCash, Microsoft,
Xerox, Visa, and Citicorp, who are trying their hands at different forms of e-cash. See
Holland & Cortese, supra note 52, at 66. Because there is competition in the market, the
efficiency justification is not at issue here. However, it is possible that after time one
firm may become dominant in producing e-cash and will obtain monopoly power in the
e-cash market. At that time, the efficiency justification will come into play. See id. at 72,
74 (discussing the threat that Microsoft will "hook its 70 million Windows customers into
the electronic-commerce networks it is developing").
156. See STONE, supra note 142, at 91-101.
157. Id. at 91.
158. See id. at 125.
159. See id. at 128.
160. See id. at 132.
161. See STONE, supra note 142, at 132.
162. See id. at 133-34.
163. See id. at 133.
164. The difficulties arise because the government is creating a monopoly by granting
the right to operate in a particular market to one or more companies in order to minimize
public inconvenience. A common example of this is the railroad companies of the early
20th century. See id. at 136-37. See generally id. at 134-39 (discussing, in detail, govern-
ment agreements and their effects on contractual relations, and the example of early rail-
road monopolies).
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evidence of any discriminatory treatment by non-banks. 65 Dispari-
ties in bargaining power and information are the two main prob-
lems that justify government regulation of non-banks.
Frequently, the government must intervene to correct instances
where there is unequal bargaining power."6 Common law allows
for voiding a contract made under duress, and "gross bargaining
power inequality" may account for some instances of duress.
When determining whether the disparity is sufficient to warrant
intervention, the government must look to see if there is a gross
inequality and whether the contract is commercially reasonable.'68
One school of thought takes a very narrow approach to the
unequal bargaining power argument to set aside terms of the con-
tract. This theory reasons that a contract should only be set aside
when there is "some defect in the process of contract formation
(duress, 69 fraud, or undue influence) or some incompetence in
the party against whom the contract is to be enforced."'70 With-
out these factors to consider, the courts would be randomly review-
ing a private agreement looking for objectionable terms. " ' This
practice would be a violation of the freedom to contract, and
should not be allowed.Y2
The last popular reason for government intervention is the
presence of information disparity. "The wide information dis-
parity between buyers and sellers of increasingly complex goods
and services coupled with the incentives that sellers sometimes
have to conceal, mislead, or deceive has led to rising concern
about whether the protections afforded by contract are suffi-
cient."'7 The problem arises only when the disparity is so great
165. Contracts are considered discriminatory if they are entered into not on the basis of
cost-benefit analysis, but rather on the basis of race, religion, sex, etc. See id. at 139-40,
46 (discussing, in detail, discriminatory contracts and how they affect economic efficiency
and free contract).
166. See STONE, supra note 142, at 146
167. See id. at 147.
168. See id. at 147-49 (discussing why unequal bargaining power and unreasonable con-
tracts constitute duress, thus preventing efficient use of market resources).
169. Duress is defined here in the narrow sense of obtaining a person's consent to an
agreement by requiring her to sacrifice one of two basic rights, physical integrity or pri-
vate property, in order to protect the other. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293, 295 (1975). Therefore, economic duress
would not be included in Epstein's definition of duress, because it does not require a
sacrifice of one of the basic rights to get the other. See id. at 297.
170. Id. at 315.
171. See id. at 294 (describing how an attitude of public intervention has entered the
legal system and thus altered how courts address contract issues).
172. See id. at 293.
173. See STONE, supra note 142, at 153 (discussing how information disparity develops
and how the government has treated such situations).
174. Id.
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that one party cannot make a rational decision.'"5 Therefore, the
purpose of information-justified regulation is to allow those parties
that are disadvantaged the opportunity to "bargain intelligently.' ' 6
"Unaided by government, few of us can incur the costs or gather
the expertise necessary to judge reasonably the quality of doctors,
the financial soundness of a stock issue, or the safety of
drugs.'
The informational disparity renders the parties unable to cor-
rectly investigate the costs of contracting-to bargain intelligently.
To understand the potential impact of being unable to make a pre-
contractual investigation, one must start from the position that
parties should only enter into contracts that will be profitable for
them.78 The parties can only make the decision to enter into a
contract after some investigation into whether their costs will be
high or low, or whether the arrangement will be profitable or
not.179 If the investigation determines that the costs will be high,
then the parties probably will not contract.'0 If the investigation
determines that the costs will be low, then the parties probably will
contract.'"' However, the parties will not know the true costs of
the contract until after it is entered into.' 2 This is why adequacy
of available pre-contract information is important. The better the
information is, the more likely the investigation will yield the true
results.
There are costs to incorrect investigation results. If the parties
believe that the costs will be low, and they turn out to be high,
then the parties either breach or pay the added costs.' 3 If the
costs are low, but the parties believed them to be high, then they
would not have contracted and will lose out on the benefit that
would have accrued to them by contracting.'84 These problems
can be minimized if the relevant information is easily available,
making the pre-contractual investigation possible or at least render-
ing it more likely to be correct. With this information, the parties
can bargain intelligently.
175. See id. (explaining that it is not the existence of an information disparity but rath-
er the extent of the disparity which determines if regulation is proper).
176. Id
177. Id. at 154.
178. See Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Prob-
lem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 406 (1988) (outlining the importance of information gather-
ing in the contract formation process).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 413 (describing the consequences of an inaccurate test for high or low
costs).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 406.
183. See Craswell, supra note 178.
184. See id.
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Towards the end of making the information more available,
there are three types of regulation that are justified by informa-
tional disparities: information regulation, performance standards,
and specification standards.' The first and least intrusive tech-
nique is information regulation.'86 This technique involves the
simple requirement that a certain amount of specific contract provi-
sions must be disclosed. 7 This approach minimizes the govern-
ment's interference and leaves the choice of how to use the infor-
mation to individual market participants. 8 However, information
regulation is not applicable when the necessary information cannot
be conveyed to purchasers in a brief manner that is readily under-
standable. 9 The ability to convey sufficient information required
to make a reasonable contract decision is a factor to consider when
deciding whether the standards should be used to regulate the
market.'9°
The second technique is the setting of performance standards,
which specify an end to be achieved and leave the means to be
selected by the individual firms."9' This is beneficial because it
allows the firm to choose the least expensive methods to attain a
goal."c Moreover, "performance standards are usually cheaper to
enforce, encourage technical change to achieve performance goals
at less cost, and reduce the risk of sanction."'93 The third and
most intrusive technique is the setting of specification standards,
which specify the means as well as the ends to be achieved. 94
This technique is only used in the most severe cases since it re-
moves all choices from the firms and actually discourages techno-
logical advancement.9 The choice between the information regu-
lations and the standards is partly a function of the severity of the
185. See STONE, supra note 142, at 161.
186. See id. (discussing how government disclosure of information minimizes govern-
ment interference because it allows the consumer to make an informed choice, rather than
making the choice for her).
187. See id. The most well known instance of information regulation is the Surgeon
General's warning on cigarette packages. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 161-62. This is the case with automobiles and prescription drugs, where
the manufacturer cannot briefly convey to purchasers all of the information about the risks
of the product, let alone in a manner that the average consumer could understand. See id.
190. See STONE, supra note 142, at 162 (discussing how both risk of harm and revers-
ibility of the harm must be considered when deciding when to impose market standards
or simply require information disclosure).
191. See id. at 163.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See STONE, supra note 142 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of perfor-
mance and specification standards).
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risk and the irreversibility of the harm.' 6 As this function grows,
the setting of standards becomes more justified.'97
Opponents of information-justified regulation usually believe
that regulation is unnecessary because competition will increase
quality, or at least provide what the consumer wants regardless of
the information available.' 98 This belief exists because many busi-
nesses rely on repeat customers and those customers will go else-
where if they are not satisfied.' 9 Even those who do not rely on
repeat customers will increase their standards for fear that prospec-
tive customers will be deterred.' Opponents do note that regula-
tion will only serve to increase the costs of deception and the
likelihood of discovery, thus bolstering the effect that the free
market alone would provide."'
The regulation of depository institutions is justified generally
by ensuring consumer confidence and protection.2 This justifica-
tion compensates for consumer deficiencies in bargaining power
and information. The bank customer cannot bargain with the bank
to ensure her protection unless the bank has incentive to do so
through federal regulation. Logic dictates that as long as depositors
are attracted to a bank without a guarantee of protection, the bank
will not make promises of security.
Most consumers suffer from lack of information about the
soundness of their bank. Even if some information is available,
most consumers lack the expertise to assess the information and
use it to bargain intelligently. Therefore, the regulations ensure that
the customers can bargain intelligently, 3 thereby protecting them-
selves. If protection of the individual consumer is not possible,
regulations will protect the general group of consumers.'
196. See id. at 162.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 160.
199. See id. (quoting RICHARD POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTSING BY THE FTC 5
(1973)).
200. See STONE, supra note 142, at 5.
201. See id. at 161 (describing the arguments in favor of regulation).
202. See BENSTON & KAUFMAN, supra note 65, at 3-4 ("Present reasons . . . include
the following . . . 1. Concern for financial panics caused by bank failures . . . 2. Pre-
venting disruptions to communities . . . when a bank's failure causes runs on other
banks . . . 3. Protecting depositors . . . [and] 4. Fear that banks will take excessive risks
because federal deposit insurance . . remove[s] depositors' concerns about the risks
taken.").
203. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (discussing why regulation is justi-
fied based on informational deficiencies).
204. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text (explaining the setting of stan-
dards).
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C. Application to Internet Non-Banks
1. Justifying Internet Non-Bank Regulation
This Note analyzes the propriety of regulating the Internet non-
banks using the general model for industry regulation described
above. The same questions must be asked about the Internet non-
banks in order to determine the propriety of regulation. Only if the
answers tend to show regulation is proper should the government
seek to intervene. Specifically, if the unregulated market is
underperforming, there is justified regulation that will cause the
market to perform better than before, and if the benefits of the
regulation outweigh its costs, then the Internet non-banks should be
regulated.' 5
The first question to be answered is whether the unregulated
non-banks are performing at a high level."° Because non-banks
are just beginning to enter the market and because there have been
no reported problems, this lack of information may lead to the
deceptive conclusion of high performance. However, the Internet
environment that the non-banks are operating in is very similar to
the pre-Depression, unregulated environment of traditional deposito-
ry institutions. The institutions in the pre-Depression environment
were hardly operating at a high level. While from 1914 to 1929,
there were 6,392 bank suspensions, that number climbed to 9,106
for the following four years.' "The series of banking panics in
the United States culminating in the financial debacle of the Great
Depression of the early 1930s are put forth as the kind of disasters
that can be averted by means of bank regulation.""2 '
As further evidence of the substandard operation levels of
financial institutions without regulation, one can look to the recent
savings and loan ("S&L") crisis. Between 1980 and 1982, two
major pieces of legislation were passed by Congress that deregulat-
ed the S&Ls.' By 1984, the S&L industry had started to col-
lapse.210 Texas was the state hardest hit by the S&L crisis.2 '
205. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (listing the relevant questions used in
determining whether regulation of an industry is proper).
206. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
207. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT, H.R.
REP. No. 81-2564 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3765, 3766.
208. BENSTON & KAUFMAN, supra note 65, at 3.
209. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (removing interest rate ceilings, raising deposit insurance
coverage from $40,000 to $100,000, and granting new powers to thrifts); Depository Insti-
tutions Act of 1982 (Gain-St. Germain), Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (elimi-
nating limits on loan to value ratio and raising the maximum amount of assets that can
be committed towards riskier activities, like commercial and consumer lending).
210. In 1984, Empire Savings of Mesquite, Texas failed, costing taxpayers approximately
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S&L failures in Texas accounted for more than one-half of the
total nationwide, creating an in-state recession where crude oil
prices dropped by nearly fifty percent, office vacancies rose to over
thirty percent, and the real estate market collapsed."' Finally, in
1989, Congress again regulated the S&L industry in hopes of re-
viving it! 3 One ex-Federal Reserve employee has strong feelings
about the unregulated environment of non-banks:
I believe that banking is inherently fragile and requires
careful regulation. Absent any regulation, banks have the
power to issue notes that are not backed by assets. They
have the power to accept deposits and then invest the mon-
ey unwisely or divert it to the banker's personal use. These
powers are inherent in any company that performs banking
functions. This will be true of the banks and funds transfer
services sprouting up on the Net as it is true in traditional
finance.
If banking on the Internet takes place in an entrepre-
neurial, unregulated environment, then I predict that within
12 months we will see a bank failure of traumatic propor-
tions. Some bank somewhere on the Net will not have
enough real-world cash reserves to redeem its notes or to
cash out its depositors. This will lead to a loss of confi-
dence and "runs" on every bank on the Net. Commerce
based on entrepreneurial banking will come to a halt.
To avoid this scenario, somehow we have to integrate
the innovative technology of the Net with traditional (or
enhanced) mechanisms that promote safety and sound-
ness.
2 1 4
Since non-banks on the Internet have the potential to be high
risk, fly-by-night operations, the unregulated market has the poten-
$300 million. See The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, (visited Aug. 28, 1996)
<http://www.fdic.govllibraryslchron.html>. By mid-1985, Ohio and Maryland were both
experiencing S&L problems, creating bank holidays, and destroying the state deposit insur-
ance funds. See id. In 1987, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which
insured deposits at S&Ls, was declared to be at least $3.8 billion insolvent. See id.
211. In 1988, the government disposed of 205 insolvent Texas S&Ls with assets of
approximately $101 billion. See id.
212. See id.
213. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (abolishing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, switching coverage to the solvent FDIC, creating the Office of Thrift Super-
vision to oversee S&Ls, and imposing meaningful net worth and other regulations on
S&Ls to help restore public confidence in the industry).
214. Arnold Kling, Banking on the Internet (Would You Pay 20 Cents to Read the Rest
of this Article?) (1995), (visited Aug. 28, 1996) <http://www.homefair.com/homefair/
banking.html>; see also Laster & Wenninger, supra note 108 (discussing the need for
deposit insurance and reserve requirements for non-bank networks).
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tial to be more inefficient than pre-Depression depository institu-
tions. Under the current scheme, Internet Cash, Inc.21 could take
all the deposits (cash, checks, credit cards, etc.) it receives and do
any number of things. For example, it could make risky invest-
ments hoping to increase its profit. Or, it could invest in long-term,
illiquid, assets. It could also take its money and disappear com-
pletely. All of these outcomes would be detrimental to the deposi-
tor. In the first scenario, if the risky investments turned sour,
Internet Cash, Inc. could lose more than its principal amount,
thereby depriving the depositor of money. Under the second sce-
nario, if Internet Cash, Inc. invested only in long-term assets, then
they would not be in a position to pay cash for e-cash if neces-
sary. All of the depositors' money would be tied up, and Internet
Cash, Inc. would have no means to reimburse the depositor. The
final situation, in which Internet Cash, Inc. disappears and deposi-
tors lose all their money, is also a possibility.
Even though it appears that these unregulated non-banks are
now performing at an adequate level, the situation is ripe for a
severe downturn. If the parallel drawn between the market environ-
ment of Internet non-banks and pre-depression depository institu-
tions is a reality, then the worst is yet to come and the unregulated
market will soon perform at a substandard level. Thus, the first
requirement for subjecting non-banks to regulation would be ful-
filled.216 However, the government should not feel compelled to
wait for history to repeat itself if all other requirements are satis-
fied.
2. Analyzing Market Perfonnance
The next question to consider is whether the regulation is justi-
fied. The justification for regulation most applicable to non-banks
on the Internet is the equity justification, based on contractual
inefficiencies.217 The equity justification, particularly because of
disparities in bargaining power and information, is the justification
most applicable to banks in general, as well as to non-banks. 218
The non-banks are in a very similar contractual relationship with
their customers as are traditional banks. 19 Further, as was previ-
ously noted, this equity justification gets "shorthanded" to consum-
215. For the purposes of this argument, Internet Cash, Inc. is a hypothetical non-bank
Internet entity that accepts deposits in exchange for e-cash.
216. See supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text (discussing substandard perfor-
mance).
217. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing the equity justification).
218. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (explaining the disparities in bar-
gaining power and information between the bank and the customer).
219. See supra notes 32-64 and accompanying text (describing various e-cash systems).
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er confidence and protection when discussing traditional depository
institutions.' To determine whether Internet non-bank regulation
is justified, we must look at specific regulations as applied to tradi-
tional banks to determine whether those regulations are meeting the
desired goal of consumer confidence and protection.
The balance sheet restrictions and deposit insurance that tradi-
tional financial institutions are subjected to are aimed primarily at
consumer protection. Specifically, reserve requirements were estab-
lished to ensure that banks would have adequate liquidity if con-
sumers demand was excessive."22 Capital requirements are used to
ensure that banks can adequately setoff and absorb losses.' In-
vestment restrictions are aimed at making sure that the bank is not
taking unnecessary risks with its assets.' Finally, deposit insur-
ance, possibly the most important of the bank regulations, was
enacted to end bank panics and runs on deposits." These tech-
niques would have the same effect on non-banks and would serve
to increase protection of the consumer's deposits.
Another type of regulation that traditional financial institutions
must comply with are the many different consumer protection laws,
mainly those involving disclosure and limited liability for unautho-
rized use.' As the system stands now, non-banks do not have to
disclose any costs to the consumer; as a result, no standard meth-
ods of disclosure have been developed. Customers are not guaran-
teed sufficient information with Internet non-banks, as they are
with chartered depository institutions. This limits their ability to
make informed decisions about which non-bank to use. Further,
there is no regulatory limiting of liability. The customer would be
open to unlimited liability if someone gained access to her e-cash
account. The liability limitations that are imposed on other types of
financial transactions are designed to protect the consumer from
this type of liability, since this was, and is, not being negotiated in
private contract.' Again, these types of regulations could be im-
posed on Internet non-banks, supported by the equity justification.
The informational disparities and unequal bargaining positions
present here are exactly the type that justify regulation in the ab-
stract.
220. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing consumer confidence
and protection as a justification for regulation of depository institutions).
221. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (describing the required reserves).
222. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (describing the capital requirements).
223. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (describing limitations on invest-
ments).
224. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (describing deposit insurance).
225. See supra notes 99-126 and accompanying text (explaining the different consumer
protection laws to which traditional financial institutions are subjected).
226. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (discussing limits on liability).
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A final point to consider when determining whether the regula-
tion of Internet non-banks is justified is the issue of consumer
confidence, which is interwoven with safety and soundness. "As
new forms of electronic money evolve, we need to ensure that
participants have the same level of confidence in these new sys-
tems as they do in the present ones."227 With the existing Internet
non-bank system, consumers are at greater risk using non-banks on
the Internet because these institutions are not subject to the same
regulation and supervision as chartered banks.' Consumer confi-
dence will grow as the safety and soundness of the institutions are
guaranteed by regulation. This effect simply supports the position
that regulation, of the type reviewed here, is justified for Internet
non-banks.
The next question to consider is whether the regulated market
will perform better than the unregulated market. One way to ana-
lyze this is to consider the alternative to regulation-a reliance on
the free market to maintain an optimum operating system. 9 This
system would rely on competition in the market to achieve these
goals.3" Most consumers using these non-banks will be expecting
the same treatment that they receive from their current depository
institutions. This treatment generally involves disclosure and limited
liability. If consumers are not getting what they expect from one
cyberbank, they may try others until they find acceptable terms.
The first cyberbank to comply will garner the most customers.
Eventually, all cyberbanks will comply in order to compete. The
same argument applies to insured deposits and, to a lesser extent,
to balance sheet restrictions. If one cyberbank has deposit insur-
ance, every depositor will choose to keep money there rather than
risking cyberbank failure elsewhere.
Competitive forces will not likely shape the market as previ-
ously discussed. Assuming that depositors cannot distinguish be-
tween the quality of non-banks, there will be no incentive for them
to provide additional services. Therefore, the market will actually
provide a lower quality product as each non-bank will not want to
give any more than the next.3 Of course, this assumes imperfect
information, which would be the case in the absence of regulation.
227. Electronic Commerce Providers Give Congress Earful, EFT REP., Aug. 2, 1995,
available on WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1995 WL 7502175.
228. See Laster & Wenninger, supra note 108.
229. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption that the
free market is the best system for achieving optimal results).
230. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (discussing how competition will
achieve the same goals as regulation).
231. Cf George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECoN. 488 (1970) (discussing the incentive for sellers to
market poor quality merchandise).
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Therefore, it appears that the unregulated market will not
achieve the important goals of consumer safety and confidence.
The regulations discussed herein can achieve these goals for non-
banks. Consequently, the regulated market for e-cash will perform
better than the unregulated market.
3. Analyzing Costs, Benefits, and Other Concerns
The remaining question is a cost-benefit analysis. 2 One po-
tential problem is that any efforts to regulate may actually destroy
the progress that these non-banks have achieved. The Federal
Reserve's members are concerned that any regulation may stifle the
emerging industryY3 If these non-banks are subjected to burden-
some regulation, many of the companies may choose to leave the
market rather than spend the effort to comply. While there is no
empirical data to support this, it is a possibility. It is not known
exactly how profitable these enterprises are. Supposing that these
are not yet gold mines, the efforts to comply with oppressive or
complicated regulation will deplete and may remove any profit
margin that exists. This is true especially if non-banks gain profit
mostly from their investments and not their fees. Regulation limit-
ing their investment activities and requiring payment of deposit
insurance premiums may be too costly for them to remain in busi-
ness. Add to this the costs of complying with consumer protection
disclosure laws and the result could be catastrophic. Since there are
no guarantees that traditional, chartered financial institutions will
enter the arena and fill the void left by departed non-banks, this
emerging area of electronic commerce and e-cash may inevitably
die.
Although these costs are huge considerations, the benefits still
outweigh them. The risks to the consumers should not be ignored
to enhance the profit margin of private enterprise. Therefore, the
final requirement is satisfied and all of the elements are in place
for regulation to be proper. However, there are other concerns to
resolve before the government interferes with the e-cash market.
One of the primary problems with regulation is the lack of
knowledge on the part of public officials. 4 Government officials
do not know enough about the Internet to make good decisions
regarding its regulation. The director of the Treasury's financial
232. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing the test to determine wheth-
er regulation is proper).
233. The Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has said that the Federal govern-
ment has "not the slightest desire to inhibit the evolution of this emerging industry by
regulation, nor to constrain its growth." Electronic Payment Law Caution Urged, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at D3.
234. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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crimes enforcement network pinned his reluctance to regulate on
his lack of knowledge, admitting that "[w]e don't know enough yet
to make good decisions." ' 5 Many other government officials are
uneducated when it comes to activities on the Internet. A securities
investigator in the North Carolina Secretary of State's office con-
fessed that "[i]t's almost embarrassing how naive regulators are
about the Internet.""5 The chairman of the House Banking mone-
tary policy subcommittee admits that some of his colleagues "can
barely read [their] E-mail." 7 Without the ability to understand
what they are trying to regulate, officials are likely to enact laws
which would lead to an end of the industry.
Some people are opposed to the idea of any government inter-
vention and simply do not see the need for regulation. Those in-
volved Internet users feel that cyberspace is a place separate from
the real world and is only for them to regulate. 8 Cyberspace has
a firmly entrenched culture which has relied "virtually exclusively
for behavioral control on a common understanding of protocol
rather than law. Its citizens have traditionally been extremely indi-
vidualistic and suspicious of centralized authority." 9 These peo-
ple probably believe that informal rules will keep these non-banks
from taking advantage of other people using the Internet.
The aforementioned considerations should not be ignored when
making the final determination. The regulations ought to be chosen
wisely so as to not stifle the industry. However, these consider-
ations do not override the appropriateness of specific regulation
that will promote consumer safety and confidence.
D. Methods of Internet Non-Bank Regulation
Assuming that the elements justifying regulation of Internet
non-banks have been satisfied, the next and possibly most impor-
tant question is how to regulate them. The previous discussion has
shown that many of the regulations that traditional financial institu-
235. Laster & Wenninger, supra note 108.
236. Jared Sandberg, On-Line: Regulators Try to Tame the Untamable On-Line World,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 1995, at BI.
237. Skidmore, supra note 1, at C3.
238. They have "[s]uch a strong sense of ... community that they routinely refer to
this world as 'cyberia,' and to themselves as 'citizens of cyberia,' or simply 'cyberians."'
Dunne, supra note 2, at 3.
239. Id. DigitaLiberty, an advocacy group, has taken this to the extreme:
[Me do believe that liberty can and will prevail in the virtual domains we are
building on the Net and that national governments will be powerless to stop
us ... We believe that cyberspace will transcend national borders, national
cultures and national economies. We believe that no one will hold sovereignty
over this new realm because coercive force is impotent in cyberspace.
Mayer, supra note 16, at El.
[Vol. 47:81
REGULATING INTERNET BANKING
tions are subject to indeed fulfill the goals of consumer safety and
confidence. Therefore, there is little need to develop new regula-
tions. Some slight modifications may be necessary because the
non-banks are different organizational entities.
The government has already tried to exert some control over
Internet non-banks. In May, 1995, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") warned First Bank of Internet, based in Des
Plaines, Illinois, that it could not take deposits without first obtain-
ing a bank charter and qualifying for deposit insurance." ° This
appears to be one of the first conflicts between a non-bank on the
Internet and the federal government's regulators. As can be seen
here, the OCC's approach to these institutions is to treat them the
same as any other deposit-taking institution-require a charter and
deposit insurance and subject them to all the same regulations. This
may or may not be the proper approach to this unique problem.
The approach taken by OCC was the easiest and may be the
best solution. One author stated that "new laws are rarely needed.
The rules of computing and exploring cyberspace are the same
rules that governed society before home computers became as
common as espresso machines: Don't steal, Don't copy other
people's work."24' In this situation, new laws and regulations also
may not be needed. As discussed previously, the concerns many
people have with non-banks on the Internet are the same as those
for existing financial institutions: deposit runs, illiquidity, and risky
behavior.242 If the current banking regulations meet these concerns
for regular banks, then there is no reason not to apply them to
Internet non-banks. Further, regulators are comfortable and confi-
dent in applying and enforcing these regulations. If the laws regu-
lating regular banks and Internet non-banks are different, regulators
will have to learn and apply a whole new set of unfamiliar guide-
lines.243
240. See "Phantom" Cyberbanks Pose Laundering, Tax Evasion Threat, supra note 127.
241. See Marjorie Lambert, Information Highway Patrol-Pirates, Peeping Toms and
Bandits are Just a Few of the Criminals who Lurk on the Internet, SUN-SENTINEL (FT.
LAUDERDALE), May 28, 1995 at 1G.
242. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
243. As one commentator has stated:
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation specifically assigned to deal with
cases of computer crime [said] that while the Bureau is beginning to feel confi-
dent in dealing with the more typical white collar crimes, there is still a sense
among agents that they are 'totally lost' when it comes to crimes related to
computers and computing. Not only are agents unsure of how to go about
proving an individual has committed a crime, they are unsure of how to estab-
lish that a crime has even been committed.
Dunne, supra note 2, at 9 n.21.
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Some of the balance sheet restrictions may have to be changed
to make sure that the regulations are meeting their goals without
imposing extraordinary costs on these Internet non-banks. The
regulators would have to realize that non-banks are not institutional
entities in the same sense as Citicorp or Manufacturer's Hanover.
Non-banks are, for now, private enterprises serving a small finan-
cial niche.
The question is whether simple information regulation or the
more intrusive standard-setting technique is required.2" This deci-
sion, generally, is made on the basis of an evaluation of the risk
and the reversibility of the harm that could stem from the enti-
ty.245 In this case, the risk of non-bank depositors losing their ac-
counts and causing financial panic through the Internet is extremely
large and irreversible. Therefore, standards would be applicable in
this case. Since the risk is so great, the lesser performance stan-
dards would not be applicable. However, the balance sheet restric-
tions and deposit insurance of traditional banks are specification
standards that would be applicable to these non-banks
The capital requirement could probably be lowered and still
protect the interests of the public and the depositor. These Internet
non-banks are not presently engaging in the loan business. There-
fore, there would be no loan losses to write off against capital.
Consequently, these non-banks may not need as large a capital
requirement as institutions engaging in loan transactions. Further,
the $100,000 requirement may be too high because it would unrea-
sonably discourage entry into the field.2" A more reasonable and
adequate requirement would be to use the $50,000 requirement that
is used for smaller populations.247 Fifty thousand dollars would
probably be enough cushion against the types of losses that non-
banks would suffer-likely to be only operating losses, not larger,
loan losses-and would not unreasonably restrict access to this
market.
Alternatively, one could look at the $100,000 or $200,000
requirement, which would possibly restrict access to only the estab-
lished companies, as beneficial. This requirement could eliminate
the fly-by-night companies looking to make a quick buck, like the
244. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text (describing the different regulatory
techniques).
245. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
246. In actuality, internet non-banks would probably be subject to the $200,000 require-
ment because the Internet has more than 50,000 users (population). See supra note 79
(discussing how the capital requirement varies depending on the population where the
financial institution is formed).
247. See id.
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hypothetical Internet Cash, Inc.2' If a company is going to raise
that much capital, it could be inferred that the company is in the
market for the long term and will make every effort to be a re-
sponsible institution. This would benefit the public and the individ-
ual depositors.
Regulators should choose to lower the required capital amount,
as applied to the non-banks. As was discussed earlier, regulation at
this juncture needs to applied carefully, balancing the interests of
the public with the desire to not limit the entrepreneurial spirit of
the Internet. In this case, the high capital requirement will most
likely unreasonably restrict access to this market and would leave
the field open only to the established institutions. However, the
established institutions may not have the desire or expertise to
enter this market and the result would be the demise of
cyberbanking.
Minimum reserve requirements should be applied to these
internet non-banks as is done with traditional depository institu-
tions. The main function of reserve requirements is to ensure li-
quidity. This could be very important for non-banks because they
are not, in most cases, experienced bankers who know how to
forecast cash needs. The reserve requirements would help ensure
that non-banks are managing their deposits safely. If any change is
required in this regulation, it may be to require more than the three
percent currently required.2 49 These institutions could be more
likely to manage their assets in a risky manner. A higher reserve
requirement would lower this risk because less of the non-bank's
assets could be used in high risk investing, thus putting a lower
percentage of the asset pool at risk. However, it would be danger-
ous to lower this proportion to a level where the profit potential is
removed since a large source of profit from a non-loan institution
is derived from investing excess assets. Taking away too much of
the profit motive will discourage entrepreneurs from entering the
field.
The investment limitations would have to remain intact to
ensure that Internet non-banks are not exchanging too much risk
for the promise of huge gains. Requiring non-banks to invest in
only investment grade bonds and no equity securities will constrain
any temptation that non-bank management could have to trade
return for risk." As was seen with the Internet Cash, Inc. exam-
ple, management's investment activities can cause huge losses for
248. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (describing investment limitations).
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depositors.s1 Only by limiting these activities can regulators guar-
antee the safety of consumer deposits.
Of vital importance is the requirement that non-banks maintain
deposit insurance. Deposit insurance is probably the most important
element of consumer confidence. There is no reason to exclude
non-banks from this requirement. Assuming that these institutions
are "engaged in the business of receiving deposits '  they will be
eligible for deposit insurance.s 3 Although the premiums will cut
into profit for non-banks, the importance of deposit insurance far
outweighs its costs. Additionally, deposit insurance will probably
increase deposits at these non-banks because consumer confidence
will increase. Further, the requirements that deposit insurance im-
poses on the depository institution will also serve to ensure the
safety of the institution.
Some of the other areas of consumer concern may not need the
strict specification standard, as the risk of harm may not be as
large. The issues of disclosure involve a lesser degree of risk than
the internal operation controls. Unlike bank failure, a consumer
error may be reversed. Therefore, this concern can probably be
satisfied with information regulations. Information regulations in the
traditional setting generally require disclosure of certain informa-
tion.
These non-banks should have to comply with the disclosure
consumer protection laws. Although the transactions that these non-
banks engage in are not exactly credit, EFT, or normal deposits,
some of the disclosure laws should apply. Internet non-banks
should be required to disclose all costs (opening, transaction, etc.)
at the time of inception. This is similar to both the credit 4 and
deposit account?5 requirements. Even EFTs are required to dis-
close all of the fees in advance."s Regulators should want to en-
sure that consumers know, up front, all of the associated costs of
dealing with a particular company.
251. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
252. Deposits are defined as "the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or
held by a bank or savings association in the usual course of business and for which it
has given or is obliged to give credit . . . to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or
thrift account." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (1994). EFT payments have also been classified as
deposits. See FDIC v. European American Bank & Trust, 576 F. Supp. 950, 956
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Although the formal definition requires the involvement of a "bank or
savings association," the non-banks' accounts satisfy all of the other requirements and
would probably be able to apply for deposit insurance.
253. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the six different factors the
FDIC analyzes when deciding whether to grant coverage to an institution).
254. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (1994) (discussing items the creditor must disclose to the
consumer).
255. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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In addition, Internet non-banks should be required to provide
periodic statements that detail the transactions made during a speci-
fied period. EFs z7 and credit transactions 8 both require some
sort of periodic statement or transaction record. Although deposit
accounts do not require a periodic statement, the regulations do
provide for what the statement must include if one is provided.' 9
In all cases, the regulators seem to believe that it is good policy to
provide the customer with a detailed record of what transactions
have been made in her account. The record provides consumer
knowledge and reduces fraud and unauthorized use of the custom-
er's account. If the customer does not receive a statement she may
never know if any unauthorized transactions are taking place.
Requiring the issuance of a statement shifts the onus to the
customer to detect any unauthorized transactions in her account."
One possible modification to this provision could be to allow the
statement to be provided on-line."sI Such a modification will re-
duce the burden on the non-bank since it would not require any
additional postage and copying expense. It may also remove the
consumer's burden of opening a mailed statement; instead, she will
examine her statement on-line.
Internet non-banks should be required to limit the customer's
liability for unauthorized transactions in some manner. However,
determining the extent of this limit is difficult. Limiting liability
too much creates a risk for the non-bank, thereby threatening prof-
its. On the other hand, regulators should be wary of allocating the
risk to the consumer. Non-banks will not find this an attractive
option either because customers will have no reason to use e-cash.
Instead, customers may actually prefer to use a credit card because
of the accompanying loss limitations. If customers have an e-cash
account and someone uses it, they will bear the full risk of loss. A
system of limited liability similar to that for EFrs is preferable.
This limits liability to only fifty dollars for the no-fault unautho-
rized transactions. However, as the customers' negligence increases,
the limits on liability decrease.262 This will satisfy both the con-
sumers and non-banks.
The best way to regulate non-bank entities accepting deposits
on the Internet in exchange for e-cash is to modify the existing
257. See id.
258. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
260. Cf U.C.C. § 4-406 (1990) (requiring the customer to "exercise reasonable prompt-
ness" in examining the statement or be barred from asserting some claims against the
bank).
261. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing DigiCash's online statement).
262. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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regulations. The regulators do not possess enough knowledge about
the Internet and cyberbanks to choose regulation that will strike the
proper balance between the competing concerns for the public and
the private enterprise." 3 For this reason, Congress should enact
new legislation covering these entities in order to consolidate the
applicable laws. Substantively, they should mimic the laws that
regulate traditional depository institutions.
CONCLUSION
As Internet non-banks change from mere curiosities to main-
stream commerce facilitators, the potential for financial crisis
changes from probable to imminent. Federal regulation of
cyberbanking appears to be imminent and well justified. Regulation
may benefit consumers as well as Internet non-banks. Experience
has proven that regulation of traditional financial institutions will
increase security, safety, and most importantly, consumer confi-
dence. Regulation of non-banks will provide the same benefits.
There are potential benefits to be gained from Internet non-
bank regulation. First, people will feel more secure using e-cash to
conduct business over the Internet, thus increasing its popularity
and productivity. Consumer confidence is needed in order to con-
vince the existing Internet users to conduct business with e-cash
rather than using another alternative. Second, as more people con-
duct business over the Internet using e-cash, cyberbank profits will
increase. Eventually, non-banks will reach an economy of scale in
producing the e-cash which will result in lowered expenses and
increased profits. Third, the increased profits will cause more com-
panies to enter the market. The resulting competition will cause
existing cyberbanks to operate more efficiently and will result in
lower prices for consumers. Proper regulation will protect the pub-
lic and foster the growth of non-banks and e-cash commerce on
the Internet.
MICHAEL A. FIXLER
263. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
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